One of the major tasks in urban water management is failure-free operation for at least most of the time. Accordingly, the reliability of the network systems in urban water management has a crucial role. The failure of a component in these systems impacts potable water distribution and urban drainage. Therefore, water distribution and urban drainage systems are categorized as critical infrastructure. Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is likely to experience harm induced by perturbation or stress. However, for risk assessment, we usually assume that events and failures are singular and independent, i.e. several simultaneous events and cascading events are unconsidered.
INTRODUCTION
One of the major tasks in urban water management is a failure-free operation for at least most of the time. Accordingly, the functional stability of the network systems in urban water management has a crucial role. The failure of a component in these systems impacts potable water distribution and urban drainage. Therefore, water distribution and urban drainage systems are categorized as critical infrastructure (Reid ). The aim of this work is to further improve risk analysis of these systems. This is done by consideration of simultaneous critical conditions for risk assessment.
Usually, risk is defined as a product of consequence and likelihood or vulnerability and hazard, respectively (e.g. UN DHA ). In this definition, hazard means a process which generates a potential stress or perturbation to a system. Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is likely to experience harm induced by perturbation or stress (Turner et al. ) . However, in this definition we usually assume that events and failures are singular and independent, i.e. several simultaneous events and cascading effects of failures are unconsidered. For instance, if a water intake (spring, tank, etc.) is out of service, water is delivered from other intakes (redundant capacity, emergency supply, etc.). Hence, the flow regime and subsequently the pressure distribution in the distribution network are changed. These changed pressure conditions can increase the probability of, e.g. pipe bursts. An example for simultaneous events in an urban drainage system is the simultaneous interruption of the power supply for an emergency pump at a combined sewer overflow (CSO) and a fluvial flood surcharge of the outlet structure, both caused by a thunderstorm. Although such failures are causally linked, a simultaneous consideration in risk analysis is hardly considered. To close the gap of single vulnerability, the term cascade vulnerability has been introduced, first in the field of computer science (Gritzalis & Spinellis ) , and is nowadays also investigated in the field of power supply (Wang & Rong ) . Cascade vulnerability accounts for cascading and simultaneous events.
Following this definition, cascade risk maps are a merger of hazard and cascade vulnerability maps. In this work, cascade vulnerability maps for water distribution systems and urban drainage systems are introduced and discussed. Test cases exhibit that neglecting cascading events results in a significant underestimation of risk scenarios.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
The presented work is based on the 'Achilles-Approach', a further enhancement of the tool presented in Möderl et al. () . This approach systematically assesses the potential hazards and vulnerability of system components for water infrastructure. With the 'Achilles-Approach', vulnerable sites of water infrastructure (water distribution and urban drainage system) can be determined spatially referenced within a GIS-environment. Therefore, the impact of component failures but also of other system changes (e.g. increase of impervious area, dry weather flow, water demand, etc.) can be holistically assessed based on hydraulic simulations. In addition to the assessment of vulnerability, also the potential impact of hazardous events can be investigated. The merger of hazard and vulnerability in the 'Achilles-Approach' is therefore a risk analysis. The development of the 'Achilles-Approach' also included new and innovative methods in risk analysis (e.g. systematic simulation of vulnerability in terms of contamination with toxins in distribution networks, cascade events, etc.).
In the course of the Achilles project, the practical application of that approach was tested on several virtual water distribution systems (Möderl et al. b) and water utilities. Moreover, the synergies between safety and rehabilitation planning were used. The implementation of water safety plans (for urban drainage safety plans see Möderl et al. a) is also considered in the 'Achilles-Approach'. The software 'Achilles' is implemented in the open source environment SAGA-GIS as a module. But it can be implemented likewise in other GIS frameworks. Interfaces to the hydraulic solvers EPANET2 (Rossman ) and SWMM5 (Rossman ) are also implemented in the Achilles module. The results of the hydraulic solvers are automatically loaded to the GIS-environment in order to utilize GIS post processing (e.g. visualization, data export, etc.) without additional effort for data management.
Systematic vulnerability assessment
The systematic vulnerability assessment with the 'Achilles-Approach' can be interpreted as spatial distributed sensitivity analysis with parameter variations accordingly to the consequences of potential hazards. For cascade effects and simultaneous events, interviews with managers of utilities, consultants and researchers are analyzed and discussed. For that purpose, a hazard checklist according to the Austrian guideline W 88 (ÖVGW W  ) and the EN 752 (EN 752 ) is introduced. Therewith, potential failures of elements (reservoirs, tanks, pipes, conduits, pumps, weirs etc.) are related to the effects of other failures. In addition, events with high potential of simultaneous occurrence are identified.
Procedural method for vulnerability simulation
Model parameter variations which represent hazardous events are defined and systematically investigated by a regional sensitivity analysis of the investigated network system (see procedural method Figure 1 ). For that, each component in the network system is sequentially modified representing hazardous events (e.g. component failure), see (1). Subsequently, for each system modification, the entire system is first simulated and then the performance evaluated based on hydraulic and water quality performance indicators (PIs), see Figure 1 step (2). In a last step, a spatial join of system PIs is applied at the modified system component with the symbolization indicating the degree of vulnerability (e.g. low vulnerable sites, high vulnerable sites), see Figure 1 step (3). Sequentially applying steps (1) to (3) to all system components results in a sensitivity/ vulnerability map, see Figure 1 step (4).
Parameter sensitivity and vulnerability maps
The modification of a component for sensitivity analysis (i.e. step (1) in Figure 1 ) emulates a specific hazardous impact. Therefore, the spatial referenced parameter sensitivity can be interpreted as a vulnerability map. In the 'Achilles-Approach', different vulnerability maps are implemented. Currently, seven vulnerability maps are implemented for water distribution systems (WDS-maps) and six for urban drainage systems (UD-maps) as default. But, the user can change parameters for the component modification and therefore also other hazardous impacts and other vulnerability maps can be created. In the following, only single vulnerability maps are discussed, which are further used for cascade vulnerability.
For the vulnerability maps discussed in Table 1 , the performance assessment is based on hydraulic simulations. A normalized PI estimates if the pressure head in a junction over time goes below a (user-defined) limit of 30 m. If it is above, it is assessed with 1 (good performance), if it is 0 m it is assessed with 0 (poor performance) and in between it is linearly interpolated. The mean value of all assessed junction values results in a system PI between 0 and 1 or between 0 and 100%, respectively.
For the urban drainage vulnerability maps discussed in Table 2 , the performance assessment is based on hydraulic simulations. This normalized PI assesses 1 if there is no flooding volume at a junction (good performance), 0 if the flooding volume is above a limit value (for this investigation V ¼ 100 m 3 ) and in between it is linear interpolated. The mean value of all assessed junction values results in a system PI between 0 and 1 or between 0 and 100%, respectively. A detailed description of PIs for water distribution systems and urban drainage systems is provided in Möderl et al. (c) . 
Cascading vulnerability maps
In the 'Achilles-Approach', different cascade vulnerability maps are calculated as default. This is done by automatically evaluating the effects of two impacts that may happen simultaneously. The maximum response induced by simultaneous parameter variations is spatially referenced at the locations of its origin. This approach is very computationally intensive and is demonstrated in this work with only a small system. To apply this approach for mid-size and large systems, high-end and respectively high-performance computers are recommended. The software Achilles is therefore parallel coded to fully utilize multi-core engines.
WDS-map: failure of a source and pipe
With this map, pipes can be identified for which a failure has a severe impact on hydraulic performance in combination with a failure of a source (e.g. tapping of a source). In case of a failure of a source or tank, but also in terms of maintenance or renovation of a tank, there is usually an emergency supply intended (e.g. with a groundwater well or redundant components). This typically results in a changed flow (direction) and pressure regime which can cause domino effects like pipe bursts. For systematically investigating these simultaneous events, first the failure of a source is assumed, i.e. modelled. Following this pipes are sequentially closed and the hydraulic system performance without each closed pipe is determined. Finally, the maximum response is symbolized at that location.
WDS-map: failure of a component and fire-fighting water demand
With this map, the simultaneous failure of a component like a pipe or junction is investigated in combination with an additional water demand for fire-fighting. The amount of additional demand is an input parameter (in this study a demand of 26.67 l/s is used according to Austrian standards). For systematically investigating these simultaneous events, a failure of a component is combined with an additional fire-fighting water demand. Then, the hydraulic performance (i.e. low pressure as PI) for each additional demand scenario is determined. Therefore, for each component a vector of results is available. For symbolization in the cascade vulnerability map, the lowest performance is used.
UD-map: failure of combined sewer overflows (CSO) and electric power supply
With this map, the simultaneous failure of CSOs and a simultaneous breakdown of electric power supply for an emergency pump are investigated. This may occur in case of a heavy thunderstorm or in flood events, when there is backwater of the river at the CSO structures. Usually, there are emergency pumps used, but in case of a simultaneous breakdown of electric power supply, these cascade events may occur. For systematic investigation of these effects, the CSO capacity is set to zero and simultaneously the emergency pumps are deactivated. For performance assessment, a PI for flooding is used.
Show cases
The different prioritizations (identification of most vulnerable sites) of model components are evaluated based on the impact of cascading failure events and a comparison with single failure events. As show cases, an alpine water distribution system for 3,000 inhabitants with two pressure zones and a drainage system for 120,000 inhabitants are systematically investigated and discussed.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In the following paragraphs it is shown how a consideration of single vulnerability underestimates the risk compared to a cascade vulnerability assessment. This is demonstrated on a water distribution system and on a combined sewer system.
Cascade vulnerability of a water distribution system
To demonstrate cascade vulnerability for water distribution systems, the single vulnerability maps for component failure (see Figure 2 left) and fire-fighting water demand (see Figure 2 right) are discussed. Therefore, the prioritizations based on these results are compared with the cascading vulnerability map (see Figure 3 ). For all vulnerability maps a criteria for low pressure of 30 m was used. As summarized in Table 3 , the component failure map indicates for which elements in the water distribution system a failure will have the severest impacts on the low pressure PI of the entire system. In Figure 2 left, the five most vulnerable junctions in terms of element failure are indicated with the numbers (1) to (5). The five most vulnerable pipes are marked with (a) to (e). In Figure 2 right, prioritization of vulnerable junctions in terms of additional fire-fighting demand is indicated with the numbers (1) to (5). No additional fire-fighting demand can be applied for pipes; therefore no results are symbolized for pipes in Figure 2 right.
Comparing the prioritization of pipes for cascade vulnerability with single vulnerability demonstrates that additional vulnerable sites can be identified with the proposed approach. Comparing in Figure 3 , the pipes (α), (β), (δ) and (ε) with the symbolization of pipes in Figure 2 left, reveals that these pipes could not be identified as important with the single vulnerability maps. Only in Figure 3 is pipe (b) also identified as vulnerable with the single vulnerability map in Figure 2 left.
The evaluation for junctions in the cascade vulnerability reveals that the system is vulnerable to fire-fighting water demand in terms of a simultaneous component failure. The minimum pressure required in case of a fire-fighting event is, according to the Austrian standards, 17 m (ÖNORM B 2538 ). When the additional demand occurs, the pressure in the lower supply zone falls under the chosen performance criteria of 30 m in the entire zone and therefore, is assessed with a low performance indicator (due to the high friction losses). For some junctions it even falls under the 17 m criteria of the Austrian guidelines. The low performance can also be seen in Table 3 in the values for the cascade vulnerability of junctions. It can also be seen, that there are different groups of junctions with the same color for visualization and therefore approximately the same resulting system PI. The grouping of the pipes could be identified as the pressure zones. Nevertheless, additional vulnerable pipes were identified with the cascade vulnerability compared to the single vulnerability approach.
Cascade vulnerability for an urban drainage system
To demonstrate cascade vulnerability for urban drainage systems, the single vulnerability map for failure of a CSO is discussed. It is also compared with the cascading vulnerability map for a simultaneous failure of CSO and a breakdown of electric power supply which causes a failure of emergency pumps (see Figure 4) . A failure of a CSO structure can be caused by a high water level in the receiving water. For that reason, emergency pumps can be installed to transport the overflow water in the receiving water body anyway. The colored triangles in Figure 4 mark CSO structures in that combined sewer system. At the marked positions (1), (2) and (3) in Figure 4 , CSOs in combination with emergency pumps are installed. The vulnerability map for investigating the impact of a failure of a CSO is shown in Figure 4 . For the marked positions (1)-(3) with emergency pumps, in the single vulnerability map there is no impact on flooding performance. This is because in case of a high water level, the water can be discharge to the receiving water with the pump. The CSOs with low vulnerability are identified to be vulnerable regarding flooding performance for the entire system in case of a failure. In comparison to the single vulnerability map, the two CSOs with emergency pumps at positions (2) and (3) could be identified with the cascade vulnerability as important sites in addition to those indentified with the single vulnerability map.
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
In this work, the term cascade vulnerability is introduced for water infrastructure. Within the 'Achilles-Approach' in this work, cascade vulnerability maps for water distribution systems and urban drainage systems are introduced. The introduced method is subsequently applied to a test case for a water distribution system, comparing the single vulnerability maps for component failure and additional water demand with a simultaneous impact. It is demonstrated how additional vulnerable pipes were identified with the cascade vulnerability compared to the single vulnerability approach. Also, as a test case for an urban drainage system, it is investigated how the failure of a CSO and the simultaneous breakdown of electric power for emergency pumps changes vulnerability. In comparison to the single vulnerability map, two of the, in total, three CSOs with emergency pumps could additionally be identified with the cascade vulnerability as important sites. The application of the introduced approach to assess risk, with consideration of cascade vulnerability for both water systems, showed how neglecting cascading events results in significant underestimation of risk scenarios. Therefore, it is demonstrated that cascade vulnerability plays an important part in risk assessment.
In order to cut down simulation time further, work will focus on the selection of elements for cascade failure based on hydraulic simulations. E.g. if there is a change in flow regime due to a failure of a source, only links and junctions with a change in pressure and flow regime are investigated for cascade vulnerability. This enables us to investigate more than two simultaneous events and therefore, domino-effect chains can be investigated.
